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Abstract—Conventional utility meters are increasingly being
replaced with smart meters as smart meter based AMIs (Ad-
vanced Metering Infrastructures) provide many benefits over
conventional power infrastrucutures. However, security issues
pertaining to the data transmission between smart meters and
utility servers have been a major concern. With large scale AMI
deployments, addressing these issues is challenging. In particular,
as data travels through several networks, secure end-to-end
communication based on strong authentication mechanisms and
a robust and scalable key management schemes are crucial for
assuring the confidentiality and the integrity of this data. In this
paper, we propose an approach based on PUF (physically unclon-
able function) technology for providing strong hardware based
authentication of smart meters and efficient key management to
assure the confidentiality and integrity of messages exchanged
between smart meters and the utility. Our approach does not
require modifications to the existing smart meter communication.
We have developed a proof-of-concept implementation of the
proposed approach which is also briefly discussed in the paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
End-to-end secure communication between utility servers
and smart meters is a key requirement for the overall security
of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The mes-
sages exchanged between the utility servers and smart meters
travel through multiple hops before reaching the destination.
Collector nodes and, sometimes smart meters act as routing
nodes. In other words, a message between the utility server
and a smart meter may travel through one or more collector
nodes and other smart meters. Different hops use different
communication protocols. For example, the hop between the
utility servers and collectors may use a 3G network whereas
the hop between the collectors and smart meters may use
a radio link. Even though most of these communication
protocols provide link level security, this is not sufficient to
protect messages traveling between the utility servers and
smart meters as compromised/malicious intermediate nodes
may not be trusted for the confidentiality and integrity of
the messages. Therefore end-to-end message level security is
essential to protect messages from atttacks carried through the
communication channels and intermediate nodes.
In initial AMI deployments, the data formats, security
measures, and protocols for smart meter security were pro-
prietary. However, because of the difficulties in achieving
secure communication when proprietary methods are adopted
and because of interoperability issues, the industry is moving
towards a common standard developed by ANSI and known
as the ANSI C12 standard [1]. ANSI C12 standard compliant
smart meters are required to store a symmetric key used to
encrypt and create message authentication codes (MAC), and
the passwords used to provide different access privileges in
specific tables in the smart meter. These keys and passwords
must in turn be protected by a secure mechanism. Approaches
by which data is encrypted with a set of keys which are in
turn encrypted with other keys are very common; for exampe
such an approach is used for SQL Server Database Encryption.
In the AMI, the application of such an approach requires a
scalable, efficient, and robust key management scheme able
to support very large number of smart meters and also able
to support smart meter authentication. In the absence of a
strong authentication mechanism, smart meters are vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle attacks. An impostor may persuade the
utility server that it is communicating with a valid smart meter
and may cause damages.
In this work, we address the problem of designing a
key management scheme able to achieve secure end-to-end
communication in the AMI. Specifically, our solution pro-
vides an efficient approach to manage keys and a strong
authentication mechanism. Our solution is based on the use
of PUF (physically unclonable function) devices which are
inexpensive to manufacture and provide a hardware based
strong authentication mechanism resistant to spoofing attacks.
We utilize the PUF devices’ hardware based one-way function
to generate and re-generate the symmetric keys and access
level passwords for smart meters. The PUF based secret
generation mechanism provides strong protection against key
leakage as the master key is never stored in memory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides an overview of the AMI and smart meters. Section III
describes the key building blocks used in our approach.
Section IV describes our overall scheme. Section V provides
an overview a proof-of-concept implementation we develop
based on the proposed approach. Section VI briefly discusses
the related work, before concluding in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we provide a high-level overview of the AMI
and smart meters. This overview focuses on the aspects that
are relevant for the presentation of our protocols and therefore
we abstract away several components and details.



















Fig. 1. A simplified AMI
The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) consists of
four main components: the utility company (utility, for short),
data collectors, often located in the neighborhood, smart
meters, and the home or office appliances. The communication
between smart meters and appliances can use several com-
munication protocols such as ZigBee, Wi-Fi, and Ethernet.
In this work, we focus only on the communication between
smart meters and the utility (see Figure 1). The messages
between these two components are transmitted across multiple
networks. These messages go through one or more collectors
and possibly through other smart meters which act as routing
nodes. Long distance communication protocols such as 3G,
EDGE or HSPDA, are used between the utility and collectors.
Short distance communication protocols such as radio links are
used between collectors and smart meters. Different network
segments use different communication protocols and have their









Fig. 2. Two components of a smart meter
An ANSI C12 standard compliant smart meter consists of
two internal components (see Figure 2): the meter board and
the communication board connected through a serial port.
The meter board contains a set of tables storing various
information including keys and passwords used for secure
communication and privilege levels. It also performs power
consumption measurements. The communication board is re-
sponsible for communications with the outside nodes such
as collectors, other smart meters, or home/office appliances,
and performing any required computation. Using an interrupt
based mechanism, the communication board fetches data and
other necessary information such as keys from the meter board
whenever it needs to send data to the utility. A common
scenario is to have the firmware in the communication board to
periodically, typically every 15 minutes, fetch meter readings
from the meter board and send it to the utility.
C. The ANSI C12 Standard
Security protocols for communication between smart meters
and the utility are defined by the ANSI C12 standards.
According to the ANSI C12.22 standard, smart meters are
recommended to use a authenticated symmetric encryption
algorithm to assure confidentiality and a message authenti-
cation code (MAC) to assure authenticity and integrity. The
authenticated encryption algorithm specified uses a variant of
EAX mode [2] called EAX’ along with AES for encryption and
a symmetric block cipher, called CMAC for authentication and
message integrity.
The ANSI C12.19 standard outlines the format and purpose
of the tables available in the meter board. For example, table
42 (the password table) stores passwords for the different priv-
ilege levels, and table 45 (the the key table) stores the keys for
encryption and authentication. Smart meters provide an optical
port through which an operator can execute various commands
based on the operator’s security level. ANSI C12.18 standard
defines six security levels, L0 to L5, with different privileges
and with the highest privilege being L5. The security level
L0 requires no password. For each of other security levels,
the password table contains a password which is initially set at
the time of manufacture or installation. The operator’s security
level is equal to the password entered to gain access to the
smart meter through the optical port. Similar to the concept
of multi-level security (MLS), the operator can execute any
command that requires a security level less than or equal to
its security level.
III. BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section, we give an overview of the key hardware
and cryptographic constructs we use in our scheme.
A. Physically Unclonable Functions
PUFs (Physically unclonable functions) are one-way func-
tions that are embodied in a physical structure [3]. A PUF
takes an input challenge Ci ∈ C, where C is the set of
all possible challenges and produces a response Ri ∈ R,
where R is the set of all possible responses. Mathematically,
a PUF can be represented as a function PUF : C → R. The
function is based on the intrinsic randomness that exists in
the integrated circuit used to generate the response and cannot
be controlled. As PUF relies on the random variations during
the integrated circuit fabrication process, even two PUFs with
the same layout results in two different functions. In other
words, it is physically impossible to make two PUFs behave
identically.
We exploit the following characteristics of PUFs in our
work.
• Given a PUF device, and a challenge Ci as input produces
approximately the same response Ri. In practice, error
correction codes, such as Reed-Solomon, are used to
remove the noise from the response and make it stable
and identical.
• Given a PUF device, and a response Ri, it is difficult to
find the corresponding challenge Ci.
• Given a PUF device, two different challenges C1 6= C2
produces two different responses R1 6= R2.
• Given a challenge Ci, two different PUFs produces two
different responses Ri 6= R
′
i.
As introduced in previous research [4], we incorporate the
PUF device in a feedback loop for a system-on-chip (SoC)
design. Figure 3 shows a high-level view of the PUF SoC.
The ECU (Error Correcting Unit) performs error correction on
the PUF response with noise so that, in a real setting, every
time the same challenge is given the PUF along with the ECU
produces the same response. The CC (Cryptographic Core) is
a stand-alone hardware component that provides cryptographic
services to the communication board of the smart meter. The
operations of the CC depends on the required functionality.
In our approach, Section IV, the CC implements a secure
hashing, and encryption operations for use by smart meters.
The Reg (register) stores the initial challenge and then later
get overwritten by the subsequent responses from PUF-ECU
component. Notice that PUF-ECU-Reg forms a feedback loop.
We utilize this feedback mechanism to generate keys chaining
responses in a sequence. This technique is similar to using
hash chains to generate one-time keys where a cryptographic
hash function is applied repeatedly to obtain a new key. An
adversary cannot derive the old keys from the new key due
to the pre-image resistance property of the hash function.
However, PUF based implementations are known to be more







Fig. 3. PUF SoC design
B. Pedersen commitment
A cryptographic “commitment” is a piece of information
that allows one to commit to a value while keeping it hidden,
and preserving the ability to reveal the value at a later time.
The Pedersen commitment [5] is an unconditionally hiding and
computationally binding commitment scheme which is based
on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 1 (Pedersen Commitment): It consists of the fol-
lowing three algorithms.
Setup A trusted third party T chooses a multiplicatively
written finite cyclic group G of large prime order p so that
the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in G.1 T
chooses two generators g and h of G such that it is hard
to find the discrete logarithm of h with respect to g, i.e., an
integer x such that h = gx. It is not required that T know
the secret number x. T publishes (G, p, g, h) as the system
parameters.
Commit The domain of committed values is the finite field Fp
of p elements, which can be represented as the set of integers
Fp = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. For a party U to commit a value
α ∈ Fp, U chooses β ∈ Fp at random, and computes the
commitment c = gαhβ ∈ G.
Open U shows the values α and β to open a commitment c.
The verifier checks whether c = gαhβ .
C. Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
(Schnorr’s scheme)
The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) protocol
used in this paper can be viewed a natural extension of
Schnorr’s scheme [6]. In our proposed approach, we use ZKPK
as a secure means of smart meter authentication to the utility.
As in the case of the Pedersen commitment scheme, a
trusted party T generates public parameters G, p, g, h. A
Prover which holds private knowledge of values α and β
can convince a Verifier that Prover can open the Pedersen
commitment c = gαhβ as follows.
1) Prover randomly chooses y, s ∈ F∗p, and sends Verifier
the element d = gyhs ∈ G.
2) Verifier picks a random value e ∈ F∗p, and sends e as a
challenge to Prover.
3) Prover sends u = y + eα, v = s + eβ, both in Fp, to
Verifier.
4) Verifier accepts the proof if and only if guhv = d · ce
in G.
IV. OUR SCHEME
Figure 4 shows the overall block diagram of smart meters
we utilize. As it can be seen from the figure, without modi-
fying the existing communication model of smart meters, we
integrate a PUF SoC with each smart meter. PUF SoC modules
act similar to a TPM but it neither utilizes public and private
key pair nor store any master keys.
In our threat model, we assume that the intermediate nodes
in the AMI and the network is not trusted for the confiden-
tiality and the integrity of the messages. Further, smart meters
are susceptible to spoofing and key invasion attacks [7].
1For a multiplicatively written cyclic group G of order q, with a generator
g ∈ G, the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) is the following











Fig. 4. Smart Meter with a PUF SoC
A. Procedures and Algorithms
Our secure AMI system undergoes the following procedures
and algorithms in order to provide end-to-end security between
smart meters and the utility.
Initialization:
The utility initializes the system by executing the
Setup of the Pedersen Commitment scheme. It defines the
cryptographic hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}
t → {0, 1}m,
H2 : {0, 1}
t → Fp, and H1 : {0, 1}
m × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m,
where t is the length of PUF responses and m is a security
parameter. These cryptographic functions are implemented
in the CC of the PUF SoC. The utility also defines two
challenges Ca and Ck in order to generate responses using
each smart meter PUF device for authentication and smart
meter secret generation respectively. Let the AMI consists of
n smart meters, Mi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Smart Meter Registration:
Using out-of-band communication, preferably before the
installation of smart meters, the utility executes the following
procedure with each smart meter Mi. We assume that the util-
ity is in physical contact with Mi so that the communication
channel is private and authentic.
The utility generates the PUF responses Ria and R
i
k giving
Ca and Ck as input. It computes the Pedersen commitment
of Ria as describe in Section III-B. It stores the Pedersen
commitment of the Ria, denoted by comi and the hashed value
H1(R
i
k), denoted by si, in its database. Since R
i
a ∈ {0, 1}
t,
before creating the commitment, Ria is first converted to a
unique value in Fp by applying H2. By storing only the
commitments, comi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, the actual responses,
Ria, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, are never leaked even if the utility
database is compromised. The hashed value of the responses
Rik are taken as the secrets si in order to prevent leaking
challenge-response pairs and guarantee strong secrets.
Refreshing PUF Secrets:
In order to improve the security, the comi and si values
are updated periodically. We utilize the feedback loop of
the PUF SoC to perform the update and use the previous
response to obtain a new response. As shown in Algorithm 1,
in order to update si of the smart meter Mi, the utility sends
the tuple (Ca, r), where r is the number iterations to be
performed at the PUF SoC to generate the new Rik. Note that
the current Rik is produced with r − 1 iterations. Let s
(r)
i be
the secret produced by executing the PUF’s feedback loop r
times and applying the hash function H1. The CC of the PUF




i , encrypts the latter with
the former and sends it to the utility. The utility can decrypt
the message using the current secret for the smart meter and
update the si and r values in its database. A similar approach
is followed to refresh comi. com
(r)
i is the commitment of
the value Ria(r) produced by executing the PUF’s feedback
loop r times and applying the hash function H2.
Algorithm 1 PUF Feedback loop to refresh secrets
1: Refresh(Ci, r)
2: rounds = 0









6: if rounds == r − 1 then
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Fig. 5. Smart Meter Authentication
Now we explain how the utility authenticates smart meters
before initiating any further communication. Recall that
during the registration, the utility stores a commitment comi
for each smart meter Mi. As shown in Figure 5, the utility
sends the tuple (Ca, r) to the smart meter Mi. Mi uses Ca
as the initial challenge to the PUF and generates the the
response Ria(r) by executing the feedback loop r times and
applying H2 on the last response. Mi provides a ZKPK
of the ability to open the commitment com
(r)
i using the
algorithm described in Section III-C. Notice that the ZKPK
of the commitment does not reveal the PUF response Ria(r)
to the utility and, in fact, the response never leaves out of
the PUF SoC. Since PUF produces volatile responses, it
is extremely difficult to carry out invasive attacks such as
extracting the responses used in the ZKPK. Therefore, the
same challenge-response pair can be used authenticate smart
meters multiple times. Further, as different PUF devices
produce unique responses, it is very difficult to clone a PUF
and launch spoofing attacks. Therefore, PUF integrated smart
meters provide strong authentication.
Smart Meter Key/Password Generation and Re-Key:
Recall that in an ANSI compliant smart meter, symmetric
keys and access level passwords are stored in two specific
tables in the meter board of the smart meter. A symmetric key
in the key table is used to provide confidentiality and integrity
to the messages communicated between the smart meter and
the utility. PUF SoC is utilized to generate the symmetric key
and store it in the key table. For the smart meter Mi, given
(Ck, r), PUF SoC generates si as explained earlier, selects a
random label l0i and generates an m-bit random value ki using
H3(si, l
0
i ). ki is used as the EAX’ encryption/decryption and
CMAC key and stored in the key table of the meter board.
Similarly, five more random labels l
j
i , j = 1, 2, · · · , 5 are
selected and an access level password, pwd
j
i (= H3(si, t
j
i )), is
created for each access level Lj, j = 1, 2, · · · , 5. The random
labels l
j
i , j = 0, 1, · · · , 5 are sent to the utility. The utility can
also generate the same key ki and the access level passwords
as it knows si and t
j
i values. In order to update a smart meter
symmetric key and access level passwords, that is to re-key,
the same procedure is repeated with a new set of random
labels. Note that each smart meter has a unique key as it is
generated from a unique response of PUF. It makes revocation
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Fig. 6. Re-keying a smart meter
Compromise of the smart meter keys kj’s or access level
passwords does not leak the PUF keys si’s due to the
pre-image resistance property of H3. Therefore, the above
re-key approach can update smart meter keys even if the
current smart meter keys are compromised.
Adding/Revoking Smart Meters:
As the secret key for each smart meter is generated in-
dependently, adding a new smart meter does not affect the
secret keys generated for the existing smart meters. The
utility executes the registration and key/password generation
procedures. In order to revoke a smart meter, the utility simply
removes the corresponding record from its database.
As shown earlier in this section, our secret generation proce-
dures use simple operations such as PUF challenge-repsponse
function, error correction function and cryptographic hashing,
and therefore our scheme can easily scale to large number of
smart meters.
B. Secure End-to-End Messaging
After generating keys/passwords or re-keying all smart
meters, the utility database looks like in Table I. The notations
and symbols used in the table are defined earlier in this section.
TABLE I
DATABASE AT THE UTILITY
Meter r (Ca) s r (Ck) com l
















2 . . . l
5
2







n . . . l
5
n
Whenever the utility wants to communicate with a smart
meter, Mi, it fetches the record corresponding to Mi in Table I
and executes the authentication procedure described earlier in
this section using the parameters Ca, r
i
a and comi. Mi can
successfully authenticate itself only if it can dynamically gen-
erate the response Ria(ri) using the integrated PUF SoC. After
successfully authenticating Mi, the utility sends authenticated
encrypted messages using the AES algorithm with the EAX’
mode. Notice that the utility derives the smart meter secret
key krii from si and t
0
i values in its database. Since only
Mi can derive this key, unauthorized access or modification
of the messages by intermediate nodes, such as collectors or
other smart meters, is prevented. Similarly, smart meters send
authenticated encrypted messages, such as meter readings, to
the utility by fetching the symmetric key from its key table
and encrypting using the EAX’ cipher.
C. Supporting Secure Broadcast Messaging
In addition to unicast messages, the utility at times need
to broadcast messages, such as firmware updates and control
messages, to a set of smart meters.
A naive approach to broadcast a message is to choose a
random session key, encrypt the message using the session
key, and finally encrypt the session key using each of the smart
meter secret keys. However, such an approach is inefficient,
as it requires multiple encryptions and decryptions.
A better approach is to utilize a broadcast group key
management scheme [8]. Using smart meter keys as secrets,
such an approach can efficiently and securely broadcast a
message to any subset of smart meters. Due to space limitation,
we omit the details.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate a proof-of-concept for our PUF integrated
smart meters for secure end-to-end communication, we devel-
oped a prototype implementation. Figure 7 shows the layout of
our implementation setup. We utilized an ANSI standard com-
pliant smart meter produced by Meter-ON which is usually
used for sub-metering. Additionally, the communication board
of the smart meter provides a way to communicate through Wi-
Fi. We implemented the PUF feedback loop using the Xilink’s
Spartan-6 FPGA board which is connected to a PC through
a serial port and the remaining functions of error correction
and cryptographic operations in the PC. The PC has an Intel
Core i5-2430 2.4Gz processor and runs a 64-bit Linux kernel
2.6.32. The PC is connected to the smart meter through the
ANSI C12.19 optical port. The utility communicates with the
smart meter through the Wi-Fi link. We used OpenSSL for the
cryptographic functions. Each execution of the PUF produced
a 32-bit output. We observed that our implementation executed
the PUF in 2.4 ms and the SHA-1 on the 32 bit PUF response
in 0.2 ms on average. We report the performance analysis of














Fig. 7. Proof-of-concept Implementation Setup
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly compare previous research work
on PUFs and smart grid security.
Physically Unclonable Functions:
PUFs have been applied in many other applications.
Gassend et al. [3] analyzes the security of PUF constructions
and apply it to several applications including smartcard au-
thentication and certified execution. Suh et al. [9] shows how
to enable low-cost authentication of integrated circuits and
volatile secrets for cryptographic operations. Atallah et al. [10]
utilizes PUF technology to bind software to native hardware
in a virtualization environment. Kirkpatrick et al. [4] presents
a hardware based approach to create read once keys which,
for example, could be applied to construct one-time programs
and perform program obfuscation.
Smart Grid Security:
Fouda et al. [11] proposes an approach to authenticate smart
grid nodes based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
Li et. al [12] proposes multicast authentication using one-time
signatures. There has been research efforts to support key man-
agement schemes for secure unicast communication [13], [14]
and broadcast communication [15], [16]. All such schemes are
based on non-volatile memory technologies and vulnerable to
spoofing/invasive attacks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed an approach to secure end-to-end com-
munication in an AMI integrating the PUF technology with
ANSI standard compliant smart meters. Our approach protects
the confidentiality and the integrity of the messages and
strongly authenticates smart meters. Furthermore, by exploit-
ing the intrinstic characteristics of PUF devices, we prevent the
leakage of secret keys utilized by smart meters. Our prototype
implementation shows that it is practical and efficient to
utilize PUF-enabled smart meters to provide secure end-to-
end communication.
As future work, we plan to design and implement techniques
to defend against denial of service attacks and to integrate
our protocols with OASIS Key Management Interoperability
Protocol (KMIP) [17]. We also plan to develop an FPGA-
based smart meter that will integrate the PUF and the smart
meter functions on a single device.
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